From 2008-2011, maritime piracy was a profitable business in the Gulf of Aden and west Indian Ocean. Originally a volunteer coast guard seeking to fend off foreign dumping and overfishing, Somali pirates developed effective methods to pursue financial ends. Terrorists might be able to use these methods to attack maritime chokepoints.
“They often use AK-47s and speedboats, and they were in [groups of] six to 10 well-armed men,” Abdi Yusuf, a counter-terrorism expert based in Nairobi, explained to the Magazine. The ships would sometimes pose as fishermen, quickly approach and board vessels using ladders, and commandeer the boat until a ransom was paid. When ships avoided their waters, they used old trawlers as mother ships, allowing them to extend their range from Somali seas “off to Yemen and even Seychelles or other international waters,” said Yusuf.
The crude method of pretending to be fishermen and then quickly seizing boats with skiffs was effective; the One Earth Future Foundation estimated the cost of piracy of the global economy to be up to $6.9 billion in 2011 and up to $12 billion in 2010. The costs came not only from ransoms, but from rising insurance premiums, fuel for faster transit in dangerous waters and more. Some vessels avoided the waterway altogether, showing that the threat of piracy was as impactful as the act itself.
Piracy declined only when the use of maritime security contractors on ships became normal and international forces began to patrol the high-traffic area.
There are many lessons that terrorists can take from Somali pirates for their own purposes. Terrorists are no stranger to the use of mother ships and speed boats, as seen with the Hotel Savoy attack. They have also hijacked vessels, such as the PLF did the Achille Lauro, but using the three together in mid-sea hijackings would be new. Al-Shabaab would be well suited to adopt the method, due to some of the connections with piracy.
“There are rumors that they have had secret deals. Even some are saying Al-Shabaab used to take 5% of their income,” Yusuf explained. “Others dispute that and claim they have had no relationship. However, it’s well known that some Al-Shabaab members later joined the piracy.”
A group like Al-Shabaab could pretend to be fishermen, quickly seize a container ship with skiffs and then commandeer it into a blockship in a chokepoint like Bab-el Mandeb.
“A blockship is a concept that has been documented for a thousand years,” Dr. Scott Savitz, a senior engineer at RAND, told the Magazine. “Sink a ship in a narrow channel and it forms an obstruction that is very hard to move depending on the size of a ship, and even using modern technology it’s very hard to get a sunken ship out of there.” The timespan to fix the impact would be weeks, not several days as with the Ever Given.
Non-state actors would be far more effective at capturing ships than pirates, who were pragmatic in their choices. As Yusuf noted, their “motivation was purely financial.” They were not willing to incur too great a risk, unlikely terrorists, who are often willing to die to achieve their objectives.
Their daring considered, a concentrated pirate-style terrorist campaign could do far more damage.
Lessons from Iran
Another maritime militant tradition with connections to terrorism is Iran and its asymmetric naval strategy. The Islamic Republic realized long ago that it cannot compete with traditional navies due to limited resources and the overwhelming power of its enemies’ maritime forces. Consequently, it has adopted a maritime guerrilla force to best utilize its strength and its enemies’ weaknesses. Iran uses mother ships, fast craft, drones to board and harass larger ships. In an emergency situation, naval commandos are convoyed to hold key islands within the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian navy also includes mines in its arsenal, which combined with the commandos can blockade the strait, another vital shipping waterway.
Iran also maintains an extensive network of terrorist proxies that it could export these methods to. The “IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) has the ability to command proxies and inspire” them to act in Iranian interests, noted Dr. Eitan Azani, director of research at ICT. Iranian proxies include the Houthi in Yemen, which is near the crucial waterway of Bab-el Mandeb. Iran trains and supplies them with weapons. Beyond this, some groups not directly controlled by Iran may be inspired by its methods.
Terrorists could use skiffs to take key islands, but it is doubtful they would have the firepower to stop ships.
“An RPG or a mortar attack has far too little firepower to sink a ship, though they could kill or injure people on deck, as well as sensitive items like antennae,” explained Savitz, “Anti-ship missiles may damage the superstructure but they may not end up sinking a ship. Even your standard cargo ship is likely to be able to withstand a significant amount of damage.”
However, terrorists may be able to emulate Iran in the use of mines.
“It is absolutely something in the reach of terrorists; they’re cheap and widely available. You could even make them in a machine shop,” said Savitz. “One of the advantages of the mines is that they’re weapons that wait, you can undertake your operation before anyone is aware. They also have a disproportionate impact.”
The fear of mines gives them greater impact than their actual presence. An entire waterway can be closed with a credible mine threat, even if there are few or no mines.
“Clearing a mine is a complicated procedure,” according to Savitz. It takes a long time to counter mines with specialized ships and equipment." Like blockships, mines are effective ways of closing a waterway for long periods at low cost and risk to the attacker.
What could happen?
Taking lessons from Somali pirates and Iran, terrorist organizations could easily create an
Ever Given crisis in a maritime chokepoint. They could set out from port with a mother ship loaded with fast craft, mines, and additional explosives. Disguised as fishermen, they could lay in wait, until a large container ship appeared. Launching their fast craft, they would quickly overtake a vessel and board it. International forces would not have long to respond – ransom is not the point as with pirates. The vessel could be used to clandestinely lay mines as it transited, then it would be piloted into a narrow part of the chokepoint and scuttled by a series of explosions below the waterline. Clearing both the blockship and the mines could take weeks, depending on the availability of response assets and the geography of the chokepoint. A terrorist mothership and her skiffs could continue to harass other ships, Iranian style, until they are hunted down by international forces.
Terrorists wouldn't have to hijack a ship — they could also buy an old ship before it heads to the scrapyard. Either is a viable approach. Also, running the ship aground is less damaging than causing explosions below the waterline — it's easier to refloat a grounded ship, like the Ever Given. To scuttle their ship, they just need explosives, not even mines.
Israel is vulnerable
The Jewish state’s security measures are predominantly against direct attacks. The problem of using mixed Iranian and pirate tactics to close a chokepoint is that it indirectly impacts Israel. As an IRGC official recently noted, 90% of Israel’s trade is by sea. Closures of the Suez, Tiran or Bab-el Mandeb would choke the Israeli economy. Israel has previously gone to war over such closures by state enemies. The threat of non-state actors doing the same is no less of a danger.
What can be done?
Global powers can pursue several measures to counter terrorist aspirations to create their own Ever Given. International efforts to protect high-traffic areas already exist. It wouldn’t be difficult to add the responsibility of the naval patrols to monitor the chokepoints. “Think tanks, scenarios, red teams” can be developed to “fully understand the threat and capabilities” of maritime terrorists, and give the patrols further tools.
The problem with blockships and mother ships disguised as fishing ships is that they appear as normal vessels, until it is too late. The possibility of success even with prepared patrols is distinct, therefore the ability to clean up an assault is needed. Salvage ships and mine sweepers need to be ready within international patrols, and wreckage-clearing capabilities need to be pursued. Israel should consider how it can contribute to international naval patrols, including vessels and intelligence to detect the planning of a blocking attack.
As with most terrorist attacks, the most crucial tool one must create is the same thing that terrorists seek: attention.
“Most important thing is to bring awareness, for decision makers to prepare and plan,” said Ariely. “If decision makers are aware of the problem beforehand, precautions against such attacks can be taken.”
Terrorists may be able to hijack a ship, but knowing the danger ahead of time will prevent them from hijacking our fears.