In today's militaristic maritime landscape, surveillance stands as a pivotal element, allowing militaries to comprehend the movements and vulnerabilities of both allies and foes.
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the value of persistent surveillance in the Black Sea region. However, maintaining such surveillance over extended periods proves challenging, demanding considerable resources. Naval surveillance complexities are compounded by Turkey's neutral control of the territorial sea and the conflict zone bordering the Black Sea.
Understanding Turkey's denial of traditional U.S. Navy access to the Black Sea, a novel approach is warranted. The U.S. Navy could delegate significant surveillance tasks to American and allied merchant vessels and deploy small units of marines or special forces equipped with military and commercial-grade sensors on these vessels. This approach mirrors China's use of a maritime militia for surveillance, aiming to leverage numerous sensors worldwide instead of investing in costly surveillance platforms.
This method, loosely based on China's maritime militia, encourages the deployment of more sensors globally without amplifying ship construction. It proposes a light-footprint model, allowing special forces to operate aboard non-U.S. vessels, expanding surveillance capabilities cost-effectively.
The challenges lie in encryption needs, ensuring communication compatibility, and the risk of attacks on commercial shipping hosting U.S. military sensors. However, during conflict, the risk to commercial shipping hosting sensors could be mitigated by transitioning to smaller deployed teams on allied vessels, thus managing military skirmishes.
Persistent surveillance remains crucial, providing a strategic advantage in planning and executing initial moves during conflict while maintaining cost efficiency. Yet, this pursuit faces obstacles due to capacity limitations and high operating costs associated with manned surveillance platforms.
However, as global tensions heighten, the need for surveillance to comprehend operational deployments and monitor belligerent actions intensifies. Expanding surveillance through delegated merchant vessels can offer near-persistent surveillance at relatively affordable prices, maintaining strategic ambiguity through outsourcing.
Inspired by China's maritime militia's existence, this approach emphasizes increased surveillance capabilities through delegated presence rather than focusing solely on new ship construction. It enables expanded coverage at a fraction of the cost, enhancing the capacity to detect and track targets.
Despite concerns over legality, this approach distinguishes itself from China's use of maritime militia by focusing solely on surveillance. It avoids provocation and maintains legality by aggregating surveillance data for military use. The intent remains to enhance surveillance, not engage in conflict or mimic aggressive behaviors.
In conclusion, outsourcing maritime surveillance to merchant shipping provides an economical solution for increased surveillance capabilities. Utilizing a network of sensors on merchant vessels offers extensive coverage, augmenting the military's situational awareness and strategic advantage without significant procurement costs. This strategic approach navigates surveillance challenges and aids in preparedness for potential conflicts.
Source: War on the Rocks