Russian Shadow Fleet Activity: Sea Horse, Cuba-Bound Deliveries and Sanctions Evasion

Russian shadow fleet operations continue to adapt to U.S. sanctions, especially in efforts to deliver petroleum products to Cuba amid the island’s severe fuel shortages and power blackouts.

The Hong Kong-flagged chemical/oil products tanker Sea Horse (IMO: 9262584), built in 2002 and managed by companies such as Hongkong Hangda Shipping Ltd or Allo Shipping Ltd, exemplifies these tactics. Earlier in 2026, the tanker loaded an estimated 190,000–200,000 barrels of Russian-origin diesel via ship-to-ship transfer in the Mediterranean. It then traveled west across the Atlantic but engaged in deceptive behavior. In late February or early March, it stopped and drifted for nearly three weeks in the mid-Atlantic (about 1,300 nautical miles from Cuba), broadcasting a “not under command” status at speeds below 1 knot. This was likely AIS spoofing aimed at hiding movements and enabling an undetected delivery to Cuba, avoiding increased U.S. scrutiny and the ongoing oil blockade and embargo on Russian fuel to the island.

The vessel used additional signs of sanctions evasion, including AIS deactivation during key operations like cargo transfers, repeated destination changes (initially Havana, then “Gibraltar for orders”), and lack of Western insurance. Reports suggest it “likely discharged” its cargo in Cuba in early March, then reappeared and continued its journey. Conflicting tracking data initially indicated a return to Cuba, but recent AIS positions (as of 23 March 2026) place Sea Horse in the Caribbean Sea/North Coast of South America, moving at 9–12 knots toward Puerto Cabello, Venezuela (ETA 24 March 2026, around 13:00–18:30 local time). This diversion, first to Trinidad and Tobago, then Venezuela, follows U.S. pressure and may be due to intimidation or rerouting to avoid interception.

No explicit sanctions target the Sea Horse itself, although it has been flagged for irregular practices, including previous Russian and potentially Iranian oil transactions. This activity occurs amid stricter U.S. measures. On 12 March 2026, OFAC issued General License 134, allowing the delivery or sale of Russian-origin crude and petroleum products loaded on vessels as of that date (initially to stabilize markets during the Middle East conflict). However, on 19 March 2026, a revised General License 134A replaced it, explicitly excluding transactions involving Cuba (along with North Korea and Crimea), while maintaining the main waiver until 11 April 2026. This amendment followed reports of the Sea Horse’s suspected early-March delivery and the approach of another sanctioned Russian tanker, the Anatoly Kolodkin, carrying crude to Cuba. The exclusion reinforces the U.S. embargo on Russian fuel to Cuba, limiting shadow-fleet options and increasing risks for operators attempting such routes.=

While the Sea Horse appears to have diverted from Cuba, the pattern underscores ongoing shadow-fleet efforts to bypass restrictions, possibly testing enforcement during Cuba’s energy crisis.

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