The decision by governments in the HRA to eliminate potentially insecure or destabilizing stockpiles of weapons from their jurisdiction, coupled with the demand from contractors for easy access to arms and ammunition, as well as the limited capacity of states to offer armed security for individual vessels, paved the way for the emergence of floating armouries.
In addition to weapons and ammunition, these floating armouries also offer supplementary logistical support like medical facilities and short-term accommodations.
Referred to at times as a "logistic support vessel," floating armouries are not custom-built ships but rather repurposed vessels that have been transformed and upgraded to provide secure and reliable storage for arms and ammunition. Currently, there are no restrictions preventing any ship from being converted into an armoury and stationed in international waters.
These floating armouries encompass a variety of vessels, including former offshore tugs, anchor handlers, research ships, patrol boats, roll-on-roll-off ferries, and even a navy de-mining vessel.
According to a comprehensive survey conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), during the peak of floating armoury operations, approximately 10-12 operators and around 20 vessels facilitated around 2,500-3,000 PCASP embarkations/disembarkations within the HRA on a monthly basis.
Fast forward to September 2018, the current estimates suggest that there are approximately 1,500-1,800 embarkations/disembarkations occurring each month within the HRA. Floating armouries have also expanded their services to include accommodations for PCASP during the downtime between transits across the HRA. Some floating armouries, known as "Floatels," operate in the Red Sea and Gulf of Oman to cater to the needs of PCASP.
The primary concentration of these floating armouries is found in the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and the Indian Ocean. Positioned at strategic points along the piracy-affected zone, these floating armouries enable operators to conveniently pick up and drop off weapons outside the HRA and beyond territorial jurisdictions.
The absence of comprehensive laws and regulations at both national and international levels governing the operations of floating armouries presents a significant hurdle for regulators and policymakers. They face challenges in adapting to the ever-evolving landscape of floating armouries.
For instance, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea expresses concerns that the lack of monitoring and regulation creates opportunities for unscrupulous individuals to exploit the situation. Rather than being seen as a solution, floating armouries and Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) are viewed as potential threats to regional peace and stability.
The absence of a centralized, publicly accessible register of floating armouries complicates efforts to determine the exact number of armouries in operation and assess the challenges they pose. Vessels used as floating armouries are registered under various 'flag states,' while the operating company may be registered in a different country. This discrepancy can lead to issues if the flag state has limited controls over the storage and transfer of military equipment, and the company's home state lacks extraterritorial brokering controls on weapons. Furthermore, the dissolution of organizations like the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI), which previously certified members through security and compliance programs, has added to the regulatory challenges.
While companies operating floating armouries can choose to adhere to applicable ISO standards, these steps are optional and focus more on PMSCs rather than floating armouries. Despite a decrease in piracy attacks, the prevalence of floating armouries and PMSCs in the area remains high. The reduction in the number of armouries and companies operating in the High-Risk Area (HRA) will likely only occur through market forces, such as a decrease in commercial contracts offered by private vessel owners for security during transits. The use of floating armouries and the proliferation of PMSCs raise critical questions about regulating emerging security actors and ensuring effective oversight mechanisms are in place to monitor and control these developments.
In regions like West Africa and South Asia, where threats to commercial shipping are on the rise, the PMSC market continues to expand.
Malta has long been a key supplier of arms to the maritime security industry, with an estimated 60% of weapons used by Maritime Security companies originating from the country. As a result, a significant number of "End User Certificates" (EUCs) are issued by Maltese authorities.
These EUCs serve as essential documents that ship owners and managers review when selecting a maritime security company for their services. It is crucial that the EUC is valid and associated with the contracted security company.
The shift in policy by Maltese authorities regarding Floating Armouries includes a new stipulation in the EUCs issued, explicitly stating that "Weapons/ammunition are prohibited from being loaded on any floating armoury."
Given that a significant 80% of maritime security companies' transits either originate or conclude on floating armouries, this adjustment marks a substantial operational change for security firms. It also poses a challenge for the various floating armoury operators in the region, as many may now find their operations non-compliant with the updated EUC terms.