Metis Insights: Yemen's Failed Truce

Yemen’s warring sides have failed to reach an agreement to extend a nationwide ceasefire. What does this mean for the maritime domain?

In our latest Metis Insights, Dryad Global analyst Arran Kennedy explores the impact of Yemen's failed truce on the maritime domain. 

Yemen's Failed Truce

OVerview

On 02 October 22, the deadline for extending the UN-brokered truce agreement between the Houthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen was missed. Since first coming into effect in April 22, the truce was renewed twice, most recently in August 22 for a further two months. During its implementation, Yemen has witnessed the longest period of relative calm since the country’s civil war began in 2014. During which there has been a significant decline in casualties, increased fuel imports into the Houthi-controlled Red Sea port of Hudaydah, and the resumption of some commercial flights to and from Sana’a airport. As it did in August, the UN is reported to have pushed for a six-month extension of the agreement, as well as an expansion of its terms. Unlike last time however, both sides failed to agree on a two-month extension without any additional terms. Reporting suggests that the coalition was open to a repeat of last round’s terms, however the Houthi’s are believed to have sought additional concessions.

In his statement following the official expiration of the truce, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg’s called for ‘calm and refrain from provocations or any actions that could lead to an escalation of violence’. Though a large-scale military escalation does not appear to have occurred – and the key elements of the truce are still holding, for now – Grundberg’s call for no escalation in violence has not been heeded entirely, with early reporting indicating a significant resumption of fighting in key areas. Fighting in numerous Governorates in Yemen resumed almost immediately after, including an apparent Houthi attempt to infiltrate (under heavy artillery cover) numerous Yemeni Army positions around the city of Taiz – a city which has long been a flashpoint in the truce negotiations.

The Potential Impact on the Maritime Domain

Throughout the truce, and particularly in the weeks leading up to the 02 October deadline, Houthi-affiliated and Houthi-aligned media notably stepped up their claims of the Saudi-led coalition seizing vessels seeking to lawfully enter the port of Hudaydah. Despite these erroneous claims – which form part of a wider effort to create a narrative of conflict, laying the groundwork to pin blame on the coalition for the truce’s demise – there were no verifiable incidents within the maritime domain. Despite this, the lapse of the ceasefire now raises the localised risk to commercial operators, operating specifically within waters east of the Hanish and al Zubair archipelago.

Attacks on Commercial Operators

Actively armed and trained by Iran, Houthi naval paramilitary forces are known to have targeted vessels associated with the Saudi-coalition, most recently in the detaining of the civilian operated landing craft M/V RAWBEE on the 02 January 22 inbound the Saudi Red Sea ports of Jizan.

Houthi rebels are also known to also have capability in the use of Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED’s) launched from the Houthi-controlled maritime strongholds of Salif and Hudaydah. WBIEDs have been intermittently intercepted and destroyed in the Southern Red Sea, primarily in the Bab el Mandeb Strait, and offshore Hudaydah and have reportedly been used in attacks on Saudi Red Sea ports of Jeddah, al Shuqaiq and Jizan.

Both before and immediately after the truce expiration, Houthi rhetoric towards Saudi and UAE based, and affiliated operations, increase. On 01 October 22, the Houthi’s warned that shipping companies inbound states belonging to the Saudi led coalition, should be ready to follow instructions from them from the evening of 02 October onwards, implying that Houthi military forces would begin disrupting commercial shipping on a wide scale. To this end, the U.S. released a Maritime Alert stating that the truce expiry ‘could result in an increased threat to merchant vessels in the Red Seam Bab al Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden’. In addition, Houthi-affiliated media reported that all foreign and local companies operating in non-Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen should cease operations and stop oil exports or will be targeted by the armed forces. In later comments, the self-described Houthi Minister of Defence told Iranian state media that the rebel group will ‘forcefully confront’ U.S. (and U.S.-backed) and Israeli naval exercises in the Red Sea, implying plans to extend attacks beyond Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Despite such threats, the Aden-based Ministry of Transportation has urged foreign companies to continue oil, gas and mineral export operations in government-controlled areas and to not comply with Houthi demands or threats. After the 02 October 22 deadline, the threats continued, extending to operations within the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Within minutes, a Houthi military spokesperson tweeted: ‘the [Houthi] armed forces give oil companies operating in the UAE and Saudi Arabia an opportunity to organize their situation and leave. This was followed by a warning from the Houthi Supreme Political Council that airports, ports, and oil companies in Saudi-led coalition countries would be targeted.

Despite the enhanced capability and recent Houthi statements, it is assessed that there remains a significant gap between rhetoric and intent. Houthi rebels are known to have the capability to conduct harassing operations within their immediate area of interest. However, within the short term, the strategic value of such an action in the face of a potential peace deal remains at odds with wider Houthi strategic intent. This is particularly the case in relation to the threats against Western and Israeli naval exercises, which are highly unlikely to be followed through given the damage to any future peace deal, the lack of historical precedent for such targeting, and the military response that such attacks would incur. Houthi rebels are likely to seek to use the language of conflict in order to further their fight for concessions as peace talks continue. As such, it remains unlikely that in the short term, Houthi aggressive action would extend to commercial shipping within the wider Red Sea. Despite this, there is an increase in localised risk within waters off Yemen specifically waters east of the Hanish and al Zubair archipelago and Saudi Red Sea ports south of Jeddah. The risk profile for this region is likely to be driven by a Houthi intent to drive a perception of control rather than an intent to return to conflict with Saudi coalition forces. As such, it is a realistic possibility that vessels operating within Yemeni waters may encounter Houthi militias in the course of operations. Vessels operating at Saudi Red Sea ports are assessed to do so at a moderate risk indicating that whilst an incident is a realistic possibility, they remain unlikely. Vessels operating west of Hanish and al Zubair should continue to do so with a heightened posture of alertness but it remains unlikely that Houthi rebels will target commercial vessels belonging to states out with the Saudi-coalition or those engaged in innocent lawful passage of international waters. 

Future Truce Agreement Prospects

Despite proclamations from the Houthi delegation that the fourth iteration talks reached a “dead end”, there remains a possibility that an agreement is re-implemented in the future. In his statement, Grundberg was keen to emphasise that negotiations are continuing. However, the UN envoy’s statement detailing his latest proposal highlights the scale of the challenge. The proposal includes:

• resolving the payment of civil servant salaries and pensions;
• the opening of  specific roads in Taiz and other governorates;
• additional destinations for flights to and from Sana’a airport;
• unhindered entry of fuel ships into Hudaydah port; and
• other measures to move the political process and economic development forward.

However none of these issues were sufficiently addressed during the third iteration of the truce or in the latest negotiations. The full opening (instead of a partial opening) of Sana’a airport, the blockade on Hudaydah port, access roads through Taiz, and the question of how long-suffering public employees will be paid all remained unaddressed in the latest iteration. It therefore remains unclear how they will be addressed in a fourth iteration, particularly now the constraining factor of the truce has been removed.

Noticeably, the UN Envoy’s statement praises the internationally-recognised Government of Yemen for positively engaging with the talks, while not extending such praise onto the Houthis. The rebels are likely using aggressive posturing as leverage in the ongoing negotiations, making the calculation that first allowing the agreement to first collapse is the most efficacious way of gaining further concessions in a future agreement. By pulling the rug from under the truce, the Houthis can use conflict – and demonstrate they have a higher tolerance of a return to it than the coalition fighting them – as a lever of influence. Conversely, the anti-Houthi coalition is increasingly splintered. Indicative of this were the August clashes between UAE-backed militias and other anti-Houthi forces over southern oil and gas fields – despite both sides being under the umbrella of the Saudi-led coalition.