Best Management Practice BMP5 Anti Piracy Measures

Here you will find:

• What is BMP5 to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security?

• Why Adopt Best Management Practices

• How does BMP5 fit in with GCPG?

• Fundamental Requirements of BMP5

• What Risks Does adoption of BMP5 address and mitigate?

• What are the Types of Maritime Security Threats considered by BMP5?

• What does BMP5 not cover

• Dryad Insights Our Expert says…

• Download BMP 5

More on this series....

Why Adopt the Best Management Practices ?

Adopting BMP5 (Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security) is crucial for multiple reasons in the maritime domain, especially within piracy-prone regions such as the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Sea.

Enhanced Security:
BMP5 provides a structured framework to enhance maritime security by offering practical guidelines on how to deter, detect, and delay piracy attacks, thereby contributing to the safety and security of both the vessel and its crew.

Risk Assessment and Mitigation:
It assists in the thorough assessment and mitigation of risks associated with piracy and other maritime security threats. Through updated risk assessment, planning, and mitigation processes, BMP5 helps in better understanding and addressing the evolving threats in these maritime regions​1​.

Effective Response to Threats:
By aiding in the timely detection and reporting of piracy attacks, BMP5 enables a more effective response to such threats, thereby potentially preventing loss of life, injury, or significant financial loss.

How does BMP5 fit in with GCPG ?

The Global Counter Piracy Guidance (GCPG1) aims to provide comprehensive support for companies and mariners in understanding and combating piracy. Both BMP5 and GCPG1 share the common goal of enhancing maritime security, but they differ in their approach. While BMP5 focuses on specific regions and offers detailed guidance on planning and mitigating piracy risks, GCPG1 takes a global perspective and provides general guidance applicable worldwide. These two documents complement each other perfectly, with BMP5 offering a more intricate approach in its designated regions, while GCPG1 presents broader, global anti-piracy guidance.

Types of Maritime Security Threats

Current threats to maritime security and shipping from belligerent external forces can come in the following categories:

• Threat from Maritime Piracy
• Threat from Anti-ship missiles
• Threat from Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device (WBIED)
• Threat from Sea Mines

Threat from Maritime Piracy

Piracy is just one form of maritime criminality. Read much more about the different types pirate activity here.  

• Pirates typically operate in Pirate Action Groups (PAG) using various boat configurations, including small high-speed open boats or skiffs.
• PAG boat configurations can include skiffs only, open whalers carrying significant fuel and towing attack skiffs, and motherships (which can range from merchant ships to fishing vessels and dhows).
• Motherships enable pirates to operate over larger areas and are less affected by weather. They often carry pirates, stores, fuel, and attack skiffs.
• Pirates may use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to intimidate ship masters to reduce speed or stop, facilitating boarding.
• The bridge and accommodation are usually the primary targets for these weapons.
• Once onboard, pirates typically head to the bridge to take control

Piracy Intent 

The motives of pirates vary based on multiple contributing factors; Somali pirates typically aim to seize control of the ship and detain the crew for ransom. As negotiations progress, the customary practice is to keep the crew on board, ensuring both the safety of the crew and the preservation of the ship. On certain occasions, seafarers have been separated based on their nationality and taken ashore. While it is in the pirates' best interest to keep their captives alive, instances of intimidation and torture have unfortunately occurred. Notably, West African piracy follows a distinct pattern, differing from the practices of Somali pirates.

Piracy Weaponry

Small arms fire (SAF) and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). 

Pirates employ a formidable arsenal consisting of small arms fire (SAF) and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to instill fear in ship Masters, compelling them to reduce speed or come to a complete halt, thereby granting the pirates easy access to board. The primary targets of these weapons are the bridge and accommodation areas. Employing a range of tactics, pirates utilize long, lightweight ladders, knotted climbing ropes, or long hooked poles to scale the ship's sides. Once successfully onboard, their objective is to swiftly navigate towards the bridge in an attempt to seize control of the entire vessel. It is at this critical juncture that they demand the ship to slow down or stop completely, enabling their fellow pirates to join the assault. Although pirate attacks can occur at any hour, a wealth of experience has indicated that dawn and dusk are prime times for such nefarious activities.

Threat from Anti-Ship Missiles 

In the event or warning of a missile attack, military advice should be followed. If no warning is received, there might be no time for mitigation beyond a PA warning to the crew if a missile is spotted. Merchant ships are unlikely to be the intended target, but they should be aware of their surroundings and keep clear of naval and associated ships.

• Long range, accurate and powerful weapons and have been used against military ships.

• Their use against merchant ships associated with regional conflict cannot be discounted.

• Other ships may be hit if the missile controller targets the wrong ship or the missile homes in on an unintended target. 

Remember:

• Stay informed about geo-political tensions

• React to heightened tensions 

Threat from Water Borne IED (WBIED)

In the early stages of an attack, it might be challenging to differentiate between a piracy or WBIED attack. Initial actions should be similar to those for a piracy attack approach. Military threat assessments may indicate areas where one type of attack is more likely.

• WBIED attacks have been used against warships and merchant ships in the southern Red Sea/BAM/western area of the Gulf of Aden.  

• Incidents have highlighted attacks by different groups operating in the region:  

• WBIED used in regional conflicts have been aimed at harming those associated with the conflict. These boats have been unmanned and operated remotely.  

• WBIED used by extremists on manned vessels have been aimed at merchant ships.  

• An attack involving a WBIED is likely to involve one or more speed boats operated by a number of individuals approaching and firing both small arms and RPGs. Masters should recognise the intent of these attacks is to cause damage and not necessarily to board the ship. Mitigation measures to prevent the speed boat making contact with the ship’s hull are limited.  

Threat from Sea Mines

Sea mines have been used to deter and deny access to key ports. These mines are usually tethered or anchored but may break free from moorings and drift into shipping lanes. Transiting merchant ships are not usually the target and it is recommended ships use the established routes such as the MSTC when passing through the identified areas.  

• Ships should avoid all published or identified mine danger areas and maintain close liaison with military authorities.

• If operating close to mine danger areas, ships should be aware that tethered mines might break free and drift into shipping lanes. Ships should manoeuvre clear of floating objects, and the forward area of the ship should be kept clear of the crew. Effective lookouts are essential.

What does the BMP NOT cover ?

The guidance given in BMP provide an essential tool-set that form a foundation of security for ships and operators.  Like all tools, the skills required to get the most out of them are learnt over time and enhanced with knowledge and experience.

• The essence of the planning process is having the most relevant and up to date security information from which to launch the voyage plan in a high risk areas.

• The formal bounds of internationally recognised risk areas may not be up to date.

• Perception is often different from truth

• Risks appetites vary from one organisation or owner to another- what is yours?

The consequences of not adopting effective security measures can be severe.

Hostages are frequently subjected to violence, ill treatment and periods of captivity that can last for several years. Other attacks have demonstrated an intent to damage ships and endanger life.

Dryad Insight - Our Experts say...

BMP5 has provided the maritime security environment with much needed guidance to combat physical security threats posed by piracy in the Indian Ocean. The document is a collaboration by consensus and inevitably it has shortcomings; mainly resulting from a rapidly evolving threats as seen through the sensitive Geo-political situation within the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman as well as across the Cyber domain.  These regional variations and constant evolution's of threat streams makes it increasingly hard for industry best practise to maintain relevance.

[BMP5]...inevitably it has shortcomings; mainly resulting from a rapidly evolving threats as seen through the sensitive Geo-political situation within the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman as well as across the Cyber domain....

Ship operators and ship owners are strongly advised to build on the BMP5 foundations by ensuring that their situational awareness of the Threat is constantly maintained with marine operations risk assessments.

• Every transit of a High Risk Area has unique characteristics that should be measured against the current threat picture as close to the time of transit as possible. 

• Additional SPM or procedures may be required in the form of additional equipment and/or personnel as a means of further reducing the risk of attack.

• Vessels should consider the utility of all SPM and select methods for their specific efficacy in mitigating the risks defined within the risk assessment process. 

• Companies should ensure that threat advice is taken from impartial intelligence providers and avoid the use of threat reporting from entities artificially invested in high risk scenarios. 

• Companies should ensure that measures that are being employed are done so after full consideration of both their efficacy and an understanding of secondary / unintended risk as a result of deployment.