ASEAN still torn over security challenges

ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, faces significant internal divisions that challenge its effectiveness in addressing regional security concerns.

This is particularly in response to the Myanmar crisis, South China Sea disputes, and broader geopolitical tensions between China and the U.S. Founded in 1967 with a mandate to promote peace and economic growth, the bloc has struggled to unify its member states in recent years, especially when dealing with pressing security issues. These divisions stem largely from the varied political systems and differing foreign policy priorities of its members.

The Myanmar crisis, ignited by the military coup in February 2021, has exposed ASEAN’s inability to present a united front. The bloc’s responses have been inconsistent, reflecting the divergent views among its members. While founding states like Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines have condemned the military’s actions and called for a return to democracy, newer members such as Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos have taken a more cautious stance, viewing the coup as an internal matter. This lack of consensus became evident when only six members supported a UN General Assembly resolution advocating for democracy in Myanmar. Despite agreeing on a Five-Point Consensus in April 2021 to end the violence and foster dialogue, the junta has largely ignored the agreement, and ASEAN’s non-binding diplomatic approach has proven ineffective in enforcing compliance.

The rotating ASEAN chairmanship has also failed to bring about significant progress in resolving the Myanmar crisis. Indonesia’s tenure in 2023, which prioritized quiet diplomacy and excluded Myanmar from high-level meetings, saw little improvement. Meanwhile, Thailand and other member states continued to engage with the military regime, undermining collective efforts. The upcoming Laos chairmanship in 2024 is unlikely to alter this trajectory, given the bloc’s adherence to the principle of non-interference and the lack of a mechanism to expel members who defy its charter.

ASEAN’s divisions extend to maritime disputes in the South China Sea, where China’s aggressive actions have heightened tensions. While Vietnam and the Philippines, both directly affected by Chinese encroachments, advocate for a binding Code of Conduct, other members with close ties to Beijing, such as Cambodia and Laos, are hesitant. This divergence hampers the bloc’s ability to negotiate a unified stance, allowing China to exploit the rifts. Despite years of negotiations, the Code of Conduct remains non-binding, and the likelihood of it becoming legally enforceable is slim, especially given China’s rejection of a 2016 international tribunal ruling that invalidated its expansive claims.

As ASEAN’s diplomatic approach emphasizes consensus and non-binding agreements, its capacity to address security challenges is constrained. The bloc’s foundational principles, while fostering dialogue, limit its ability to enforce decisions or impose punitive measures. The rotating chairmanship system further dilutes its effectiveness, as a single year is rarely sufficient to resolve complex issues like the Myanmar crisis. The situation is unlikely to improve under upcoming chairs, with Malaysia’s 2025 focus on economic priorities signaling a continued preference for engagement over confrontation.

In summary, ASEAN’s internal divisions, coupled with its diplomatic limitations, weaken its stance on regional security issues. The bloc’s non-binding approach and lack of enforcement mechanisms leave it ill-equipped to address ongoing challenges, from Myanmar’s turmoil to the escalating tensions in the South China Sea.